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Introduction
The existence of the "Directors' and O¢ cers'" (D&O) insurance market presents something of a paradox and raises issues that seem to call for public policy intervention. It could be argued that the ability of shareholders to hold board members and senior executives personally liable for mismanagement of the company, by being able to take them to court and extract damages if such mismanagement -the breach of …duciary duty towards shareholders -is established, is an important instrument of corporate governance. To allow these same board members and executives to be indemni…ed against the costs of such proceedings, as D&O insurance appears to allow, apparently removes this instrument, and, to add insult to injury, the cost of the insurance is borne by shareholders. The moral hazard problem appears obvious. This has led to calls to outlaw or regulate the D&O insurance market, 1 which can be expected to grow as the market itself grows and the sequence of …nancial crises and corporate scandals continues.
If managerial remuneration is part of the agency problem rather than a solution to it, as argued for instance by Bebchuk and Fried (2004) , the existence of D&O insurance seems to support the hypothesis that directors and senior managers run companies in their own interests rather than those of shareholders. However, recent contributions to the literature on the economics of agency suggest that this view could be questioned. Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) propose an alternative explanation of managerial remuneration contracts based on a challenge to a basic assumption about the stock market that is taken as given in the literature. This is that the stock market value of the …rm always appropriately re ‡ects its underlying long run fundamental value. Against this, Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong argue that the experience of stock market bubbles in the past decade suggests that large movements in stock prices are driven by short run pro…t motives that cause stock prices to deviate signi…cantly from their fundamental values. It can be therefore in the interests of an initial group of shareholders to provide incentives to managers to take decisions -"undertake projects" -that stimulate such short term bubbles, allowing them to make capital gains by selling their shares to new investors with higher pro…t expectations. Thus, as with the traditional approach, the initial shareholders design incentive schemes which align the interests of 1 See for example the article in the Economist, (12 June 2003) with the headline: "Double Indemnity: Company Executives Should Pay For Their Own Mistakes". directors and top executives with theirs, but in a way that does not maximize the long-run value of the company.
This suggests a reinterpretation of the reason for the existence of D&O insurance, as a credible promise to senior management to cover the risk that they may be sued by future shareholders in the event that the pro…t expectations they held when they bought the company's shares are
disappointed. An alternative would be to make up-front payments, but the model presented in this paper shows that when directors and o¢ cers are risk averse it is less costly for the initial shareholders to provide them with D&O insurance. We do not argue of course that this is the only motive for large companies to buy D&O insurance, or that all such companies conform to this model. We believe however that it is an interesting and quite realistic hypothesis about a possible aspect of D&O insurance demand that deserves to be taken to the data.
An important related contribution, which in some respects anticipates the idea underlying the Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong model, is that by Chalmers, Dann, and Harford (2002) . They examine the three-year post-IPO performance of …rms' shares and show that this is negatively correlated with the D&O insurance coverage taken out by those …rms just prior to the IPO. They interpret this as evidence that managers who are behaving opportunistically, by timing the IPO to coincide with what they know is an overvaluation of the company's shares, seek to protect themselves against being sued because of the following poor performance of the shares. They suggest that "[o]ne cost of selling overvalued equity is that directors and o¢ cers face an increased likelihood of being sued by disgruntled shareholders". 2 This is also a central idea of this paper. Chalmers, Dann, and Harford see it as supporting something like a Bebchuk-Fried theory of corporate governance. They do not however adduce evidence to show that the managers were not in fact acting with the full agreement of the then owners of the …rm, who also stood to gain, in timing the IPO to coincide with its current overvaluation.
This therefore remains an open question, and one on which this paper attempts to shed light.
Overall, the number of studies dealing with D&O insurance is relatively small. Parry and Parry (1991) use a standard agency model with D&O insurance as a component of managerial remuneration and carry out a comparative static analysis of the optimal compensation package with respect to the loss distribution and insurance premium. Gutierrez (2003) employs a principal-agent model and a three-stage dynamic game of complete but imperfect information. The shareholders can take legal action against the director and the court's decision provides a veri…able, costly and imperfect signal about the agent's ful…llment of …duciary duties, thus allowing her remuneration to be made contingent on the court's decision. Gutierez shows that given damage awards are high enough, liability insurance is optimal because it allows for a more e¢ cient litigation strategy to be ex-post rational for the shareholders.
In addition to Chalmers, Dann and Harford already discussed, O'Sullivan (1997), Core (1997) , Bhagat, Brickley, and Cole (1987) and Boyer (2003b) , present empirical analyses. O'Sullivan examines the link between the purchase of D&O insurance and managerial ownership, board composition and the presence of large outside shareholders for a sample of publicly owned UK companies. The results suggest that as …rm size increases so do the costs of external ownership as a monitoring device, so that larger …rms are more likely to use D&O insurance as a means of monitoring. Moreover, the study con…rms the hypothesis that executive ownership and D&O insurance can be interpreted as substitute monitoring devices. Core (1997) examines the determinants of D&O insurance demand for a sample of Canadian …rms. His …ndings suggest that …rms with greater litigation risk and distress probability, as well as …rms in the utilities sector, are more likely to purchase insurance, whereas …rms with greater inside ownership are less likely to purchase insurance. However, in contrast to O'Sullivan, Core does not …nd evidence that director cash compensation substitutes for D&O.
Among the more recent articles on D&O insurance are the contributions by Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2011), Lin, O¢ cer, and Zou (2011), Boyer and Stern (2012) and Gupta and Prakash (2012) .
Cao and Narayanamoorthy's (2011) results support the litigation risk hypothesis. They examine the consequences of litigation risk (re ‡ected by D&O premia) on the decision of management to issue earnings forecasts. In the presence of ex-ante litigation risk, managers with bad news are more likely to provide bad-news earnings forecasts. This is not the case for companies with good earnings news. Lin, O¢ cer, and Zou (2011) explore the impact of D&O insurance on the outcomes of M&A deals. Their …ndings indicate that the acquisition premia are higher the larger the D&O protection of acquirers is. The latter supports the hypothesis that D&O insurance can be a cause of moral hazard by limiting the disciplining e¤ects of shareholder litigation. Further evidence for the corporate governance risk hypothesis is provided by Boyer and Stern (2012) , who …nd that income trusts, which are characterised by a riskier ownership form, pay higher D&O premia than common equity …rms. As opposed to previous studies, Gupta and Prakash (2012) …nd that, besides governance quality, D&O insurance also re ‡ects managers'private information. Their results suggest that D&O coverage limits are lower the larger the insider control is that goes beyond insider shareholdings.
Given that some opponents of this type of insurance argue that D&O insurance harms shareholders through adverse incentive e¤ects, Bhagat, Brickley, and Cole (1987) consider the e¤ects of D&O insurance on shareholder wealth for a sample of New York-traded publicly chartered …rms.
They …nd, on average, a positive relationship between the two variables, and thus conclude that under certain circumstances D&O insurance might even align the interests of shareholders and managers. The idea that D&O insurance can be interpreted as a means to protect the shareholders rather than managers also …nds support in Boyer's (2003b) paper. Using a sample of 354 Canadian corporations for the years 1992-1998, Boyer's results suggest that the demand for D&O insurance, as a directors'compensation component, is a means of shareholders'wealth protection. Moreover, the existence of such insurance can substitute for monitoring by …nancial institutions.
In this paper we interpret the theoretical model by Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) , though it does not itself deal with D&O insurance, as suggesting an entirely new rationale for this controversial form of indemnifying managers against the consequences of their decisions. We begin by developing this idea in a model that is much simpler than theirs, but also more amenable to empirical testing, extend it to incorporate D&O insurance, and then go on to carry out the empirical tests. The next section gives a brief overview of the D&O insurance market. In Sections 3 and 4 we present the model and analyse the insurance decision, and the empirical analysis follows in Section 5. Section 6 presents our concluding remarks.
D&O Insurance
A D&O insurance policy is purchased and owned by the …rm but indemni…es its directors and o¢ cers against the costs of being sued. In case of a lawsuit against an individual director or senior executive, 3 the D&O policy reimburses the associated costs, provided the director or executive is 3 Roughly 50% of cases are brought by shareholders, the remainder by employees, customers, suppliers etc.
shown to have acted honestly and in good faith, in the best interests of the company as perceived at the time. Two types of insurance are common: corporate coverage which reimburses the …rm when it indemni…es a director or senior executive for the costs of a suit; and personal coverage which provides direct payment to a director or senior executive when the …rm is not able to indemnify him or her.
D&O insurance was …rst introduced in Germany in 1895, but it was soon banned by the Imperial Insurance O¢ ce on grounds of being considered immoral. In the US in 1929, following the stock market crash, new laws were enacted to improve investor protection and prevent directors from abusing corporate indemni…cation provisions at shareholders' expense. At that time, since companies did not indemnify directors against compensation claims, Lloyd's of London developed a D&O insurance product.
In the 1960s, changes in the interpretation of the securities laws created the realistic possibility that directors and o¢ cers themselves, and not only corporations, could face signi…cant liability.
However it was not until the 1980s that the D&O market really started to develop. Nowadays, the demand for such insurance is high, given the frequent suits against directors and senior executives by customers, shareholders and other third parties, but the market and the contract characteristics di¤er to a large extent between the USA and Europe, and signi…cant di¤erences exist even among European countries. In the US, D&O insurance is common and 95% of Fortune 500 companies hold D&O policies, whereas in Germany around 70% of all enterprises have such a policy.
According toTowers Watson (2009), a company that surveys 2,599 U.S participants, the average amount of coverage across the survey's participants amounted to US$10.61 mn in 2008. The largest companies with assets exceeding US$10 bn purchased policies with coverage amounting to an average of US$128.75 mn. The mean deductible across all companies amounted to US$191,000, or roughly 2% of the average coverage bought. Participants with assets exceeding US$10 bn carried average deductibles of US$3,621 mn, or around 3% of average cover. Not only are these deductibles on average small, but one frequently encounters in the data companies where no deductibles are set at all, especially in the second type of policy -personal indemnity for a director or executive.
Since deductibles are a standard means of dealing with moral hazard, this suggests that this is, perhaps surprisingly, not perceived as a serious problem by insurers in this area. 4 4 At this kind fof level one might conclude that the deductibles exist to avoid the transactions costs associated
In discussions with insurers we were given as possible explanations for this …rst, the fact that legal infringements such as fraud and deception automatically nullify the insurance contract, and secondly, that these contracts are not "over the counter" standard products -a considerable amount of monitoring, including inspection of the records of directors and executives, and discussion of the company's corporate governance regime, takes place before the contract is concluded. 5 Where insurers have serious doubts, we were told, they prefer not to o¤er the contract. Thus it would seem that asymmetric information between insurer and insured does not play a signi…cant role in this market.
The large amounts of money involved in lawsuit settlements in the US and in Europe respectively suggest the quantitative signi…cance of this market. In the past years, the largest settlements in 
The Model
The paper by Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong presents a very general model which, for our purposes here, su¤ers from the drawback that it does not have a closed analytical form for its solution. An explicit solution is given for the case in which the agent -the CEO of a large joint stock company -is risk neutral, but this is not very appealing, since it is based on the familiar result that in this case the optimum is for the owners to sell the company to the agent. Otherwise, in the case of a us what we should expect when we take the model to the data.
There are three time periods, t = 0; 1; 2: At t = 0, the initial shareholders, I; o¤er manager 6 M a contract, which must meet participation and incentive compatibility constraints. M chooses e¤ort levels e s 2 f0; 1g and e l 2 f0; 1g to put into a "short term" project 7 and a "l ong term" project, respectively. The respective projects return s 2 fs 1 ; s 2 g; l 2 fl 1 ; l 2 g; with s 1 < s 2 ; l 1 < l 2 . The The key assumption of the model is that "good news", = 2 makes N -investors "more optimistic" about returns s to the "short term" project than the I-shareholders. We model this by making:
N -investors have a higher conditional probability belief than I-shareholders that the higher outcome will be received if the signal is the more favourable one. For simplicity we also make
The interest rate is zero 9 and short sales by I and M are ruled out.
At t = 0 the I-shareholders o¤er M a contract which gives her the incentive to choose what are for them the optimal e¤ort levels (e l ; e s ) 2 f0; 1g f0; 1g: A priori all four e¤ort pairs could be optimal, but to restrict attention to the cases of interest we make Assumption 3:
Given the inequality of the probabilities held by N and I in (1), then the optimal contract that the I-shareholders o¤er M implements (e l ; e s ) = (1; 1). In the absence of this inequality I would want e s = 0:
Thus, the presence of, from the I-shareholders'point of view, "over-optimistic" or N -investors makes it pro…table to give M an incentive to put e¤ort into the short term project.
M 's utility function: is u(w) (e l ; e s ); with u(w) strictly concave and (e l ; e s ) convex, and both functions strictly increasing.
If, given (1), at t = 1 the signal is 2 , and ignoring for the moment the possibility of suing M ,
depending on the outcome of the l-project, which by assumption is known at t = 1.
If 1 is observed, I-investors sell no shares at t = 1 and receive at t = 2 the value of the …rm
Again for simplicity we make:
Assumption 4: When the signal at t = 1 is 2 ; N -investors pay their valuations for the …rm's shares, which are therefore the payo¤s to the I-investors in these states.
This concludes the presentation of our simpli…ed version of the Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong model. We now introduce the possibility that the N -investors may sue M ex post, while the Ishareholders can take out a D&O insurance policy at t = 0 to indemnify M against the consequences of this.
The Insurance Decision
In the event that the signal at t = 1 is 2 ; the N -investors who have bought into the company may at t = 2 sue M if they are dissatis…ed with the …rm's performance. In fact we make
Assumption 5:
If M is sued, she loses and has to pay D. 10 N -shareholders sue if and only if s = s 1 : 11 Ishareholders never sue.
An immediate consequence of this assumption is that N -shareholders'valuation at t = 1; given that they will sue and receive D ex post when s = s 1 ; become ex antê
Assumption 4 then implies thatv N i becomes the value of the …rm to the I-shareholders at t = 1
given the occurrence of the signal 2 : The share price in that event capitalises the expected return to N -shareholders of suing at t = 2 when s 1 is the outcome, so this bene…t essentially ‡ows to the I-shareholders, regardless of whether and how they choose to indemnify M .
A competitive insurance market exists at t = 0, which o¤ers D&O insurance at a premium, r.
Given Assumption 5, the prior probability (held by I-shareholders and M ) at t = 0 of M being sued at t = 2; given that e s = 1 is implemented, is p = (1 s (1)) (1) (5) D = pD is therefore the expected cost at t = 0 of being sued at t = 2. Then, if full cover is bought, and given that the insurer also believes that the probability of M being sued 12 is p, we can write the premium as r = (1 + ) D; where 0 is a premium loading.
Why would the risk-neutral I-shareholders buy full cover for M even at a positive loading > 0? If they promised to pay D to M in the event she is sued, this would only cost them D:
The problem is that this is not a credible promise, since by that time the I-shareholders have sold their shares and moved on. The important point about buying D&O insurance at t = 0 is that it is a credible commitment 13 to fully compensating M in the event she is sued. The only credible alternative would be an upfront payment to M at t = 0; which satis…es her participation constraint 1 0 To make the outcome of the case probabilistic would be more realistic but changes nothing qualitative in the results. 1 1 There is clearly no reason for them to sue if their over-optimistic expectations, relative to those of I and M , are in fact ful…lled. 1 2 Recall the discussion in the Introduction concenring the absence of moral hazard in this market. 1 3 Assuming a zero risk of insolvency of the insurer.
given the probability of eventually being sued. We now prove that, because M is risk averse, the I-shareholders will always prefer to buy the insurance even at a positive loading as long as it is not "too high":
Proposition:
On the assumptions of the model, there is a critical loading > 0 such that for ; the I-shareholders will always prefer to buy D&O insurance rather than compensate M by an up-front payment.
Proof: Let the subscript (ijk) denote the state of the world fl i ; j ; s k g; i; j; k = 1; 2; with ijk their associated probabilities as perceived by the I-shareholders and M . Given that M is to implement (e l ; e s ) = (1; 1); let [w ijk ] be a vector of payments that satis…es all participation and incentive compatibility constraints in the absence of the possibility of M being sued. In particular
where the value of her outside option is normalised to zero. When M can be sued but full cover D&O insurance is bought, the same payment vector can be implemented. The cost of this to I-shareholders is the lump sum
which is the cost of the premium minus the gain in the value of the shares at t = 1, which we assumed was captured by the I-shareholders. When instead an up front payment, say d; is made, for the participation constraint to continue to be satis…ed we must have
Clearly we must have d < D; and so the vector of payments on the left hand side of this equation is a mean-increasing spread of the original distribution, since two of the payments are smaller, all the remaining payments are larger, and they have to yield the same expected utility. It follows that
Then, D&O insurance will be bought if and only if d
The simple intuition behind this result is that D&O insurance is a means by which the I investors can commit to compensate the agent -satisfy her ex ante participation constraint 14 -in the event that the short term project turns out badly and she is sued by the N -shareholders, even after they themselves have sold their shares and moved on. The insurance bought at t = 0 represents a commitment to M; since it guarantees that she will be indemni…ed after the I-shareholders sell
out. An up-front payment to M at t = 0 would have to be greater than D; and therefore costlier to the I-shareholders, because of M 's risk aversion.
The model suggests also what we should expect to observe in the data if the underlying theory is not to be rejected:
A necessary condition is that there should exist volatility in the shares of a company, in the sense that its stock prices are driven higher by "good news" which may not re ‡ect the outcome of its "fundamentals".
The probability of being sued and the amount of damages will be greater, the greater the probability of realisation of the bad state s = s 1 following publication of the "good news" 2 which drives up the share price, and the greater the over-optimism of the N -investors. This suggests that the demand for D&O insurance should be positively related to a company's share price volatility, its susceptibility to good and bad news driving share price ‡uctuations.
We must observe a signi…cant change in share ownership, as I-investors sell out to N -investors.
Contrary to the hypothesis of Bebchuk and Fried, there is no problem of corporate governance in this model -executives are behaving according to the incentives set for them by the board. Under the Bebchuk and Fried theory, the extent of D&O cover would be a re- ‡ection of managers'power to determine their own compensation, and so we would expect it to vary inversely with standard measures of the quality of corporate governance, such as the proportion of independent directors on the board.
We now take the model to the data.
Empirical Analysis

Speci…cation and Data
We collect data on our two alternative dependent variables, namely a company's D&O insurance maximum coverage, in year t (Coverage it ) and the insurance premium (Premium it ), from the companies' proxy statements for a panel of Canadian …rms, because these are required to disclose whether they purchased D&O insurance and, if so, to give the details of the policies. 15 Since the insurance policy contracts are renegotiated only once a year, it is su¢ cient to focus on annual data.
Each of the two outcome variables (both measured in logs) is, ceteris paribus, a measure of the potential cost and risk of providing insurance to the company concerned. Given the amount of coverage o¤ered, the premium is an indicator of the insurer's estimate of the loss probability. The data collected on premia re ‡ect the actual prices paid for the insurance policy, the total amount paid by the company in the respective year. 16 We also merge these data with two other panel data-sets which contain useful information of the solution to it. Accordingly, good corporate governance should matter, and thus in ‡uence also the extent of D&O insurance coverage and the contracted premia. 18 For a given coverage, we would expect premia to be lower, the more independent the directors are, and therefore the better corporate governance is.
We consider an alternative hypothesis in this paper, namely that demand for insurance may be rationalized by the existence of new investors who may sue the manager in case they are not satis…ed with the results of past actions in relation to more short-termist projects. For this, we use the ‡uctuation in the share price as a measure of speculation, and we measure the new shareholders by the number of new institutional shareholders and, alternatively, by the increase in the number of a company's common shareholders between two consecutive years.
Summary statistics on all dependent and independent variables mentioned above are presented in Table I . According to the …rst block in Table I, is -0.67. For both the dependent and the independent variables the variance is smaller than the mean. 19 According to the second block of Table I , the average log premium amounts to 13.13 (around US$503,842), the standard deviation and median are 1.21 and 13.13, respectively. 20 - Table I and II here - 1 9 Altogether, we have information on 138 …rms in 5 years for which data on coverage, new institutional shareholders share price volatility, and all other control variables are nonmissing simultaneously. The median …rm exhibits a positive coverage in less than 3 years. Hence some …rms switch in or in and out of insurance coverage during the sample period and some …rms have a coverage limit of zero in some years. Therefore, the sample in Model B in Table  III , for instance, is based on 388 observations rather than 690 observations when focusing on a positive coverage limit. Estimates of …xed-e¤ects sample selection models suggest that the bias of the parameters of interest due to this potentially systematic sample reduction is negligible, though.
2 0 Altogether, we have information on 131 …rms in 5 years for which data on premium, new institutional shareholders share price volatility, and all other control variables are nonmissing simultaneously. The median …rm exhibits a positive premium in less than 3 years. Therefore, the sample used, for instance, in Model B in Table IV is based on 372 observations rather than 655 observations when focusing on a positive premium.
Econometric Model
This section focuses on an estimation strategy which is suited to estimate the e¤ect of our measures of the quality of corporate governance or the presence of new shareholders and speculation, on the D&O insurance contract's components. We denote the log of the insurance contract outcome of company i = 1; :::; N in year t = 1996; :::; 2008 by y it . Furthermore, we introduce the row vector of …rm-and-time speci…c covariates x it and a conformable column vector of parameters along with a …rm …xed e¤ect i and a …xed e¤ect st which is speci…c to sector s; s = 1; ::::S and year t. 21 Formally, the log-linear version of the model we estimate may be represented as MarketToBook it ; DebtToAssets it ]: The …xed e¤ects i + st ensure that the parameters on the covariates of interest do not re ‡ect company-speci…c or sector-time speci…c e¤ects, which should not be attributed to a …rm's corporate governance standards. The latter completely avoids an endogeneity bias of covariates of interest in the respective dimensions of the data.
In the subsequent sections, we present results which are based on variants of the model in equation (6). To test whether the extent of D&O insurance is also driven by the existence of new shareholders who have di¤erent beliefs than incumbent shareholders, we consider the e¤ects of speculation, measured by the volatility of the share price 22 as well as its interaction with new shareholders, measured alternatively by NewShareh it and ChangeShareholders it . Notice that the coverage of the data will vary across speci…cations so that we report summary statistics for each sample, separately.
Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of D&O Insurance
Key further candidates of determinants of the D&O insurance coverage or the premium are …rm variables such as Assets it , as a proxy for size, ReturnOnAssets it as a measure of performance,
MarketToBook it as a proxy for a …rm's growth opportunities as well as DebtToAssets it as a measure of …nancial risk. Their relevance for the dependent variables at stake can be rationalized as follows.
Larger companies should have a higher demand for insurance as they face a higher probability of lawsuits than smaller ones (see Boyer, 2003a) . Given the higher coverage, the price of the insurance, i.e., the premium, is also expected to be higher (see also Boyer, 2003a) . There is no clear-cut hypothesis regarding the contemporaneous e¤ect of the performance measure ReturnOnAssets it on outcome. We do however hypothesize that a better past performance should induce a lower D&O insurance coverage, premium and deductible. 23 As expected, in most speci…cations (Model B when using the insurance coverage as a dependent variable and both Models A and B when using the insurance premium as a dependent variable), the e¤ect of a good …rm performance in the past has a negative impact on the coverage and the premium. The results are signi…cant at the …ve or ten percent levels, respectively. Regarding market to book value, we hypothesize, as with Core (1997) that a higher value implies higher coverage and accordingly also higher premia, because the shareholders of such …rms want to avoid underinvestment problems. Furthermore, to be able to exploit these growth opportunities, they expect managers to take more risks in their projects and therefore opt for higher insurance coverage, which e¤ectively induces directors to be less risk averse. The opposite applies for companies with low growth opportunities, where shareholders want managers to behave more carefully and monitor projects more closely, so that they impose more risk on them (see also Core 1997) . Lastly, we expect that the higher the debt asset ratio, the higher the implied …nancial risk of a company, so that the price of the insurance, namely the premium, will be higher. Table III, - Table III here -In Table IV , we perform the same type of analysis for the insurance premium. The speci…cation using the interaction between ChangeShareholders it and CVPrice it , the change in the number of 2 4 We have also performed a Hausman test to see whether a random e¤ects or …xed e¤ects model is appropriate. The null hypothesis that the random e¤ects model is appropriate is rejected and hence a …xed e¤ects estimator is chosen for estimation. 2 5 The company …xed e¤ects capture all possible time-invariant …rm attributes such as being listed on the U.S. stock exchange (in the sample period, this is a time-invariant characteristic to the considered …rms). Hence, that some companies may also be listed in a country that is more litigious than Canada is controlled for in the regressions through company …xed e¤ects. shareholders in the presence of speculation has, as expected, a positive e¤ect on the insurance premium. The result is signi…cant at the ten percent level.
- Table IV here -Thus, our speci…cations con…rm the core hypothesis that the presence of new investors has a positive impact both on the D&O insurance coverage and the D&O insurance premium. Furthermore, larger companies in terms of Assets it have a higher coverage and insurance premium. These results are once again signi…cant at least at …ve percent.
Sensitivity Analysis
Given that not all companies decide to purchase D&O insurance, we assess whether a selective choice of D&O insurance biases the results. To test for sample selection we follow the approach introduced by Wooldridge (1995) to correct for selection bias with panel data. This approach requires estimating …rst-stage probit models for each period separately. 26 The inverse Mills'ratio based on the linear index of the …rst-stage models serves as a control function in a second-stage regression, where the log of the coverage limit and the log of the insurance premium are used as dependent variables, respectively. The results of these regressions are sensitivity checks of the results in Tables III and IV and are summarized in Table AIII in the Appendix. Sample selection does not seem to be a problem in the regressions where the log of the coverage limit is employed as a dependent variable as suggested by the insigni…cant coe¢ cient on the inverse Mills' ratio. Furthermore, the coe¢ cients of our main variables of interest, namely ChangeSh it xCVP it and NewSh it xCVP it are still positive and signi…cant at least at the …ve percent level. With log insurance premium as the dependent variable, even though the inverse Mills' ratio is signi…cant at …ve percent, the coe¢ cient estimates of interest -namely the ones for ChangeSh it xCVP it and NewSh it xCVP it -have the same sign and signi…cance as and are quantitatively comparable to their counterparts in Table IV. As suggested by Core (2000) , the insurance premium may also depend on excess coverage purchased, which can be measured as the residual to a regression which expresses the log coverage limit in terms of the dependent variables as presented in Table III . The rationale for including excess coverage as an explanatory variable of log insurance premium is that it captures information that is orthogonal to the other determinants of the insurance premium. Coverage limit exhibits discontinuities at discrete multiples of US$5 mn. These discontinuities may contain information that has an impact on the insurance premium. The results of these regressions which include as an additional control the residual coverage limit, AbnCovLimit it ; are summarized in Table AIV in the Appendix. As the numbers in Table AIV show, the coe¢ cient of AbnCovLimit it is positive and signi…cant which is in line with the results in Core (2000) . The coe¢ cients of our main variables of interest, ChangeSh it xCVP it and NewSh it xCVP it ; are equivalent in sign and magnitude to their counterparts in the baseline regressions presented in Table IV . Hence, excluding the excess coverage limit from the model does not bias the results of primary interest to this paper.
Finally, we add a number of additional control variables which can also in ‡uence the demand for D&O insurance, following Core (1997) . We gather this additional information from the companies' annual reports, annual information forms, management circular or proxy information from SEDAR.
The potential candidates considered are presented in the following. LitDisc it is a binary indicator variable equal to one if the company discloses pending or higher litigation in its annual reports, and zero otherwise. According to Core (1997) , we expect …rms that exhibit pending litigation to display a higher litigation risk because of negative e¤ects on reputation or because litigation may induce higher D&O claims. InsValue it represents insider ownership measured as the share of the company's total common shares outstanding owned by inside directors. We do not have a clear-cut expectation of the e¤ect of this variable on the demand for insurance coverage for two reasons. On the one hand, the better alignment of incentives may be negatively correlated to the insurance coverage whereas, on the other hand, under the risk aversion hypothesis a higher share of insider ownership may imply a higher demand for D&O insurance. Since D&O claims may also result from divestitures, Core (1997) suggests controlling for whether the company sold substantial assets or divested a business. Hence, we consider an additional indicator variable Divestor it which equals one if the …rms displayed in its reports income from discontinued operations and special items exceeding 3% of total assets, and zero otherwise. Finally, we employ a measure of excessive director compensation ExcessPay it . This variable is constructed as the standardized residual from a weighted least squares regression of director pay on possible determinants. 27 Notice that company …xed e¤ects capture whether the company is a utility or not and whether it is listed on a US exchange as well or not, since these characteristics are time-invariant in the data at hand.
The results of these robustness checks are summarized in Table AV in the Appendix. As the numbers in Table AV show, the coe¢ cient estimates of interest -namely the ones for ChangeSh it xCVP it and NewSh it xCVP it -have the same sign and signi…cance as and are quantitatively comparable to their counterparts in Table III . The same applies to the regression results where the insurance premium is used as a dependent variable. Once again, the coe¢ cients of the main variables of interest are similar in sign and magnitude to their counterparts in Table IV . Hence, excluding these further control variables does not bias the estimates of interest to this paper.
Conclusion
This paper is concerned with analyzing so-called "Directors'and O¢ cers'" (D&O) insurance. The purpose is to gain a better understanding of the raison d'être for this insurance market, at least in the case of listed companies. Applying the framework of the model introduced by Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) allows us to reinterpret the role of D&O insurance. If managers act in line with incentives designed to promote the interest of initial shareholders when they take decisions that encourage short-term overvaluation of the …rm's shares, this can strictly speaking not be labeled as a failure of corporate governance. Furthermore, we also shed light on the empirical support that can be given to this theoretical approach, by testing whether not only the characteristics of corporate governance, but also the existence of new shareholders and volatile markets, in ‡uence the demand for and supply of D&O insurance. Using a panel of 232 Canadian companies for the years 1996 to 2008, our results suggest that the existence of new shareholders in the presence of 2 7 We follow Core (1997) closely and assume that director compensation is a function of …rm-speci…c covariates, proxies for …rm risk and stock ownership. Firm-speci…c variables considered are the …rm assets (Assetsit); the market value of equity; both measured in logs, a proxy for growth opportunities de…ned as sum of the …rm's liabilities and market value of equity divided by the book value of assets. Firm risk is measured by the annualized volatility of the daily compounded return for the prior year and by a dummy variable which shows whether the company is also listed in the US: Finally, director compensation is also a function of inside ownership (InsValueit) and a dummy variable which equals one if directors were also awarded stock grants or options. Furthermore, we follow the same weighted least square estimation procedure where weights have been computed in the same way as in Core (1997) volatility leads to an increase in the amount of D&O insurance coverage purchased by companies, consistent with the idea that if senior executives are to be given the incentives to use such volatility to make short run gains in share prices, they must be insured against the adverse consequences of their doing so.
The empirical results also suggest some conclusions for public policy toward the D&O insurance market. In the …rst place, as we suggested in Section 2, the concern that the availability of D&O insurance creates a moral hazard problem does not seem justi…ed: asymmetric information in the form of a moral hazard problem does not appear to be signi…cant and this form of insurance does not seem to be positively associated with standard measures of bad corporate governance. Our results are robust to a host of sensitiviy checks, by means of including additional control variables or testing for sample selection.
However, the theory and empirical results in this paper do suggest a new concern: D&O insurance does provide a convenient instrument for initial owners of a company to take advantage of short term bubbles and di¤erences in beliefs of insiders and outsiders in capital markets in the way modelled by Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong. Note that it is not the function of the D&O insurers to decide whether decisions are being taken in the long-term interests of the company, but rather to evaluate the probability of and likely costs arising from litigation, and provided they have the information to do this and set premia accordingly, they are happy to take the business. Corresponding diversion of resources into short-term investments that may worsen the long-run performance of a company, and the costs associated with the litigation that may result, are however real resource costs to the economy rather than just redistributions among shareholders. At the same time, one cannot blame the D&O market for the existence of the preconditions that favour its use, and, given that much of the insurance is bought by companies that are not subject to stock price volatility, and for which therefore the hypothesis proposed and tested in this paper does not apply, it is arguable that the appropriate policy solution is to address the more fundamental aspects of capital market failure. Notes: All regression models include fixed sector-year and company effects. AbnCovLimit it is compputed as the residual of the regressions on coverage limit from Table III . Notes: All regression models include fixed sector-year and company effects. Figures below coefficients are standard errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively (using two-tailed test statistics).
